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FROM PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE TO NATIONAL ECONOMIC 
GROWTH: DO SYSTEMATIC INVESTMENT PRACTICES 
MATTER? 
Arwiphawee Srithongrung and Kenneth A. Kriz 
ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the path effects of systematic government investment on national 
growth. We build a theory where government investment practices, along with other 
institutional variables, affect the quality of a country’s core public infrastructure sys-
tem. This, in turn, positively affects national productivity. Using the path analysis meth-
od, we test our theoretical framework on a sample of data drawn from 25 developing 
economies during the period from 1990 to 2000. The results suggest that a unit increase 
in systematic public investment practices indirectly enhances national productivity with 
an increase of about $10-$15 in a country’s real per capita GDP through the better 
condition and service capacity of a country’s core public infrastructure. 
Keywords - Developing Countries, Economic Growth, Public Capital Budgeting, Public 
Investment, Systematic Management 
INTRODUCTION 
In the public budgeting and finance literature, systematic capital spending has been rec-
ommended to government practitioners for several reasons. First, capital budgets may 
be larger than operating budgets. Second, public capital spending will result in public 
infrastructure whose quality and service are visible to the citizens and last for several 
decades. Third, public infrastructure has potential economic effects on national produc-
tivity. This study examines the third point: Is there any significant effect of systematic 
public investment on national economic growth through the quality and accessibility of 
the public infrastructure system?  
The empirical results from the international development literature indicate that for low 
income countries, public capital expenditure exhibits negative effects on growth (Dava-
rajan, Swaroop & Zou, 1996), while the quality of the public infrastructure system cor-
relates with a country’s national growth (Kumar-Jha, 2005: Dabla-Norris, Brumby, 
Kyobe, Mills, & Papageorgiou, 2011; Calderon and Serven, 2010 and 2008). In order to 
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improve the quality of the public infrastructure system in these countries, the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) (2005; 2010) recommends that a government adopt sys-
tematic investment approaches, including capital and fiscal planning, program budget-
ing, and investment evaluations. 
The above practices are promising given that in the countries where resources are lim-
ited, waste and fraud should be eliminated and every dollar spent should be tied to 
meaningful, socially-desirable outcomes. Comprehensive planning and rational budget-
ing are keys to enhancing the economic growth in developing countries (Caiden & Wil-
davsky, 1974). Caidan and Wildavsky (1971) defined comprehensive planning and ra-
tional budgeting as “government effort and activity to understand how different ele-
ments of the economic system including public and private consumption, saving, in-
vestment, and demand for good and service interact.” Accordingly, if the interrelation-
ships among these factors are known, it is possible to determine national spending and 
taxing policies so as to enhance economic growth. Based on this concept, our study hy-
pothesizes that systematic public investment practices can enhance a country’s national 
productivity by providing quality public infrastructure services to the citizens in effi-
cient and effective management approaches. 
Given the above assumption, this paper examines the direct and indirect impact of gov-
ernment capital investment practices on national growth through the quality and service 
capacity of a country’s core public infrastructure system. The unit of analysis is devel-
oping countries whose real annual per capita Gross National Income is less than $3,725 
per person (The World Bank, 2011). To the authors’ knowledge, development study that 
focuses on the complete linkage from government capital spending practices to public 
infrastructure outputs (in terms of quality and accessibility) and from infrastructure out-
puts to economic growth in a single study is rare. 
Recently, Dabla-Norris, Brumby, Kyobe, Mills, and Papageorgiou (2011) produced a 
Public Investment Management Index (PIMI) based on four criteria: i) systematic guid-
ance and project appraisal, ii) project selection and budgeting, iii) project implementa-
tion, and iv) project evaluation and audit. The index focuses on measuring a country’s 
government efficiency in public infrastructure provision and services. The PIMI were 
built based on extensive data collected from multiple sources of a country’s public in-
frastructure practices.1 The PIMI appears to perform well in terms of both construct 
validity and internal validity. The construct validity requires that the four compositions 
of the index are relevant and thus reflect all dimensions of the efficiency provision con-
cept. The construct validity of PIMI is justified by the reliability statistics for the sub-
index correlation. The internal validity of the PIMI is shown through relatively high 
correlation between the country’s real per capita GDP level and the efficiency index. 
Dabla-Norris et al. (2011) suggest that the next step is to investigate whether PIMI as a 
country’s institutional practices for public investment enhance economic growth in the 
middle and low-income countries (p.21). We adopted Dabla-Norris et al.’s (2011) sug-
gestion in taking the next steps by linking public investment practices with their output 
(which is infrastructure quality and accessibility) and outcome (which is a country’s 
economic growth rate). However, in this study, we use our own self-constructed indica-
tors that are time variant focus on the aspect of fiscal planning relative to a country’s 
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fiscal health and macro-economy, rather than the entire process in infrastructure invest-
ment, as PIMI does. In this aspect, our index could be considered as a sub-set of the 
entire investment process. The empirical results thus reflect the partial effect of good 
investment practices on growth path. 
This study is also different from previous developmental research in that, for the second 
step in linking infrastructure output to outcome, it examines two different dimensions of 
public infrastructure provisions, namely, the quality of public infrastructure and citizen 
access to infrastructure, rather than simply examining public infrastructure spending 
level. The former is a meaningful performance indicator of public capital spending out-
come, while the latter is simply an indicator of government activity. Recently, Calderon 
and Serven (2010 and 2008) used a similar measurement in investigating the relation-
ship between public infrastructure outputs, namely the quality and quantity of public 
infrastructure and growth, in Latin American countries (Calderon & Serven, 2010) and 
sub-Saharan countries (Calderon and Serven, 2008). The authors employ IV-GMM 
methodology in which instrumental variables including population growth and lagged 
growth rates were included in the first stage regression to prevent feedback loops rang-
ing from growth rate to infrastructure quality and quantity. The authors found that both 
quality and quantity are positively related to economic growth and negatively related to 
income inequity index in 21 Latin American countries (Calderon & Serven, 2010) and 
in 36 sub-Saharan African countries (Calderon & Serven, 2008). These studies thus 
provide a strong theoretical background for the proposed second linkage from infra-
structure outputs (namely quality and accessibility) to growth in the current study. 
This study is organized as follows. The next section describes the theoretical back-
ground. The following section presents the data, empirical results, and discussion. The 
last section presents implications and the conclusion. 
THEORETICAL BACKROUND 
Systematic and Comprehensive Capital Investment Practices 
In the public budgeting and finance literature, capital budgeting is an administrative 
system that links long-term capital improvement programs to the methods that will be 
used to pay for those improvements and provides for the implementation of these long-
term financial and physical plans (Hillhouse & Howard, 1963). The normative public 
budgeting literature recommends systematic capital investment practices, including 1) 
long-term capital planning (Ammar, Duncombe, Wright, 2001; Gianakis, McCue, 1999; 
Moak, Killian, 1963; Government Finance Research Center, 1983); 2) program budget-
ing (Moak & Hillhouse, 1975; Grifel , 1993); and 3) fiscal planning (Steiss & Nwagwu, 
2001). These management practices parallel fundamental concepts of results-oriented 
management in which organizational effectiveness and managerial activities are di-
rected toward achieving organization-wide systematic goals (Kettl, 1997). 
Capital planning involves identifying the list of major capital projects that the citizens 
will need within a five- or six-year period, along with potential resources to finance 
them, and the impacts of the projects throughout their useful lives (Vogt, 2004). Public 
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infrastructure stock inspection, as well as infrastructure needs-analysis relative to busi-
ness investment, actual citizen usage, and future usage are the keys in this process 
(Ammar, Duncombe & Wright, 2001). According to the management literature, capital 
planning ensures investment effectiveness by being responsive to businesses and resi-
dents’ needs in terms of the accessibility and service quality of the public infrastructure 
system (Government Finance Research Center, 1983). 
Program budgeting involves balancing annual capital spending with limited public re-
sources (Moak & Killion, 1964). Project selection based on its benefit and cost analysis 
is the key for this practice since it eliminates low benefit projects (Aronson & Schwartz, 
2004). Fiscal planning involves projecting future resources, including increasing the tax 
base, incomes, and other freed-up public resources (Steiss & Nwagwu, 2001), as well as 
conducting a debt capacity analysis (Vogt, 2004) and maintaining debt policies in order 
to enhance credit rating (Johnson & Kriz, 2005). Fiscal planning and program budgeting 
together thus identify the optimal level of public investment that should result in an ef-
ficient public infrastructure system. 
 
The Public Infrastructure System, National Economic Growth, and Some Research 
Cautions 
A large number of studies have investigated the relationship between public infrastruc-
ture spending and national economic growth (Aschauer, 1989; Aschauer, 1990; Mun-
nell, 1990; Garcia-Mila & McGuire, 1992; Moomaw, Mullen & William, 2002, Lucus, 
1988, Islam, 1995). However, the findings in these studies are mixed, depending on the 
samples, the indicators used to measure the infrastructure systems, and the set of control 
variables used in testing the models. Among these studies, the work by Davarajan, 
Swaroop and Zou, (1996) deserves more discussion since they found that in developing 
country samples, public investment reduces the country’s economic growth while public 
consumption enhances growth. The development literature in 1990s was quiet in ex-
plaining why public capital spending exhibits a negative effect on growth. 
In the 2000s, the development literature started to shed some light on explaining why 
spending in public infrastructure is not a good indicator in empirical growth model, es-
pecially in developing countries, even though public stocks are important elements in 
production functions suggested by growth theory. In building the PIMI index, Dabla-
Norris et al. (2011) argue that “the link between capital spending and capital stock ac-
cumulation, and hence, growth, is weakened by the evidence of low efficiency of public 
investment” (p. 5). According to Dabla-Norris et al. (2011), the notion that public in-
vestment spending is equivalent to public infrastructure stock and accumulation; thus, 
public investment spending can be used as an alternative indicator for capital stock in 
empirical growth model is problematic. This is because in low- to medium-income 
countries, high degrees of investment inefficiency and corruption often distort the out-
come of public investment, especially in terms of economic growth (Dabla-Norris et al., 
2011). This argument is confirmed by the two empirical studies from Calderon and Ser-
ven (2010, 2008). As mentioned in the introduction section, when public investment is 
alternately measured by quality and quantity of public infrastructure, Calderon and Ser-
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ven (2010, 2008) found a strongly significant and positive relationship between infra-
structure quantity and quality and economic growth. 
The concept that efficiency and effectiveness in public infrastructure investment prac-
tice can lead to economic growth is not new. In 1994, the World Development Report 
for Infrastructure Development (1994) argued that efficient and effective public infra-
structure provisions and services will not be possible in low-income countries unless 
institutional arrangement in terms of public policy and management practices that are 
relevant to infrastructure provision are fully reformed. According to the report, three 
elements will contribute to efficient and effective infrastructure system. The first is 
practicing business-like management in acquiring public infrastructure. The bottom line 
for this practice is to give autonomy to the infrastructure acquisition operators (whether 
public or private sectors) but hold the operators’ accountability through performance 
contracts and measurements. The second is to set the price of public infrastructure pro-
vision and service through either tax rate or user fees and user charges in a way that 
reflect the true demands from the public. Such practices will guarantee both an optimal 
level of public investment and efficient resource allocations, in the sense that the new 
infrastructure will be located where needs are greatest. The last is to broaden competi-
tive markets for public infrastructure provision and management by awarding the pro-
vider roles to not only the central government but also to private sectors and sub-
national governments, depending on these agents’ expertise. For example, the central 
government may operate roads and bridges given that there is benefit spillover through-
out the country, while airports may be provided and managed through a lease system 
due to technical expertise of the private sectors. Likewise, municipal governments 
should provide local water and sanitation service systems, given that they are closet 
operator to the citizen users. 
The World Development Report (1994) also suggests that to achieve the three practices, 
public management institutions in poor countries must be completely reformed by 1) 
de-monopolizing the roles of central government in providing and managing public in-
frastructure and 2) de-bundling the sectors of public infrastructure services such as 
transportation, communication, and health so that the infrastructure in different sectors 
can be operated by different agents. Possible practices in de-monopolizing and de-
bundling include contracting-out, leasing, building, and transferring, as well as public-
private partnership. Thus, to summarize, the World Development Report (1994) viewed 
that efficiency in an infrastructure system cannot be achieved through small-scale re-
form, but that large-scale institutional changes to assure good governance can be firmly 
established. 
The linkage between good governance and growth are not straightforward. Kaufmann 
and Kraay (2002) establish the Worldwide Governance Indicators constructed through 
the qualitative and quantitative data drawn from 32 international development institu-
tions and think-tank organizations worldwide (the full list of these sources is provided 
in Table 2 of Kaufmann and Kraay’s (2002) article). Kaufmann and Kraay’s indicators 
represent good governance in six dimensions: voices and accountability, political stabil-
ity, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. 
Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) further investigated the relationship between the level of 
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economic development measured through a country’s log of per capita income and the 
level of good governance in 26 Latin American countries. They found a strong and posi-
tive relationship from the level of good governance to the wealth of the country sam-
ples, but a weak and negative relationship from the level of country’s wealth to the level 
of good governance. 
Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) thus conclude that there are no feedback loops from the 
level of per capita income through a country’s wealth level, given that good governance 
is a well-established system a country has adopted for quite a long period (40 years or 
more). In other words, a country’s good governance is like a country’s resource-
endowment in which the country can yield the benefit in later years of a long-term peri-
od. If this is the case, the empirical growth study should find evidence that some devel-
oping economies do converge with the developed economies by exhibiting high-speed 
growth rate. Meisel and Aoudia (2008) later doubt this conclusion, given that the con-
vergence is found in several growth studies. 
Using Douglas North’s (1990) concept of institutional arrangement, Meisel and Aoudia 
(2008) define good governance as a system in which the rules of the games in mobiliz-
ing a country’s resources are well defined and formally accepted, hence lessening the 
uncertainty for all economic agents by ensuring that the rules of laws are followed by 
the other agents in the society through any transactions. According to Meisel and 
Aoudia (2008), good governance means 1) effectively functioning formal rules ensuring 
the respects of property and contracts; 2) effective and not very corrupt administrations; 
3) an efficiently regulated market; and 4) respected rules of democracy. Together, these 
four aspects mean that the country with good governance will tend to have a relatively 
high degree of rule formalization. 
Through a principal component analysis method, Meisel and Aoudia (2008) construct 
the degree of rule formalization through six indicators from the World Bank’s govern-
ance indicators (i.e., voice and accountability, political stability, government effective-
ness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption) and the other 77 variables 
from the Institutional Profile (IP) database. In a scatter plot analysis between the log of 
a country’s per capita income and the degree of rule formalization, Meisel and Aoudia 
(2008) found that there is a strong and positive relationship between the “level” of eco-
nomic development (measured through log of per capital income) and the degree of rule 
formalization (i.e., good governance indicator). However, when the log of per capita 
income is replaced by a country’s speed of economic growth (i.e., the difference in log 
of per capital income—that is, annual percentage change of per capita income), Meisel 
and Aoudia (2008) do not find a strong and positive relationship between good govern-
ance and medium- to long-run growth path. 
In the same paper, Meisel and Aoudia (2008) find that there are at least two steps in 
moving from developing to developed countries. The first step is to accomplish what 
they call “the governance focal monopoly,” which refers to “an administrative system in 
which a country’s management and policy priority are concentrated on acquiring the 
capacity for coordination and systematic vision, improving the quality of basic public 
goods and, in legal field, on element of formalization of rules that is essential for society 
that are mainly rural, namely agricultural property right” (Meisel & Aoudia, 2008, p. 
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22). Once a country accomplishes this first step of development, it can move through 
the developed stage by focusing more on the openness and formalization of a social 
regulatory system as measured by the World Bank’s governance indicators. Examples 
of the countries in the first step include Thailand, Mexico, and Kuwait, while countries 
in the second step include Taiwan, Korea, Malaysia, China, and Vietnam, to name just a 
few (see Graph 7 in Meisal and Aouda, 2008). 
Put together, the work by Meisal and Aouda (2008), the World Development Report 
(1994), Kauffmann and Kraay (2002), and Calderon and Serven (2010, 2008) explain 
why public infrastructure spending is not a suitable indicator for public stock in an em-
pirical growth model, especially in two aspects: a) public investment in developing 
countries may be distorted by the lack of good governance, which is a strong foundation 
for economic development in the two developing stages, and b) public investment in 
developing countries may be inefficient due to high levels of corruption and lack of ex-
pertise, which makes quality and accessibility of public infrastructure better indicators 
than public spending. 
In addition to the above discussions, public investment spending is not suitable for an 
empirical growth model for cross-country investigation given that public capital stocks 
in different countries depreciate at the different rates depending on the usage level and 
social and economic activities of each country. Bu (2004) empirically proves that in 
developing countries, the infrastructure depreciation rate used in calculating public and 
private capital stocks is not the same across countries, as economic and social forces can 
make national capital spending and capital formulation rates significantly different. 
These social and economic forces include corruption in capital goods procurement and 
incompatible infrastructure facilities and technical services, as well as government in-
centives to obtain new infrastructure through foreign aid funding rather than maintain-
ing their existing infrastructure (Bu, 2004). The author asserts that the same capital de-
preciation rate calculated through capital spending levels across different countries’ 
samples can yield invalid estimates of the effects of the infrastructure system on nation-
al productivity. 
Due to the above concerns, this study measures public infrastructure service through 
public infrastructure’s quality and population accessibility rather than public capital 
stocks or capital expenditure. These infrastructure indicators are discussed in the follow-
ing section. 
Conceptual Framework 
Combining previous findings and the prescribed government capital investment practic-
es, we form a set of hypotheses that stem from the basic theoretical argument that sys-
tematic capital budgeting and management practices will result in an effective public 
infrastructure system. In this study, an effective public infrastructure system is defined 
as the physical condition of a country’s core public infrastructure, including road, elec-
tricity, and water systems, as well as citizen accessibility to the main public infrastruc-
ture systems. 
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A country’s effective public infrastructure is thus measured through two constructed 
variables: 1) the average percentage of a country’s paved roads to total road miles and 
uninterrupted electricity and water distribution output; and 2) the average percentage of 
people with accessibility to the country’s roads, electricity, water, and communication 
facilities. Therefore, we measure government infrastructure investment by the annual 
quality and accessibility of public capital stocks rather than annual public capital ex-
penditure. The reason is that the former measures government investment outcomes, 
while the latter is simply a record of government accounting, which may be subject to 
different depreciation rates and the lack of good governance across countries that may 
lead to misleading effects on growth. 
At present, there are no time-series data on countries’ public capital budgeting and man-
agement practices.2 The PIMI was published in 2011, which is about the same time this 
paper was in progress. According to Dabla-Norris et al. (2011), the PIMI is a time-
invariant factor in growth models. In this study, systematic capital budgeting and man-
agement practices are regarded as time-variant factors in the sense that such budget and 
capital planning practices can be changed from year to year in the same country. Given 
that systematic capital budgeting and management practices focus on comprehensive 
fiscal and capital planning, the concept is measured by three indicators: 1) the percent-
age of public investment to consumption, 2) the elasticity of public investment, and 3) 
the percentage of long-term debt interest to total revenue. The theoretical concept be-
hind each indicator is described below. 
The percentage of public investment to consumption 
Effective governments should be able to balance consumption and investment rather 
than withdrawing investment for consumption, especially when the country’s resources 
are limited and the economy is declining (Easterly & Schmidt-Hebbel, 1993). Fiscal 
planning helps the investor to identify infrastructure funding capacity relative to its rev-
enue sources and consumption demands (Murdick & Demming, 1968). To capture this 
concept, we divided a country’s annual total public infrastructure spending by its annual 
total current public operation and multiplied the ratio by 100. A larger value indicates 
that a government is relatively capable in terms of fiscal management of maintaining 
public investment spending without having to withdraw investment in that particular 
year. 
The elasticity of public investment 
We calculate the elasticity of public investment by dividing the annual percentage 
change of a country’s total public investment by the annual percentage change of total 
private investment. Therefore, larger index values indicate that a government is relative-
ly responsive to private production activity and infrastructure demands compared to the 
smaller index values. Note that since this variable is not simply the ratio of public in-
vestment size to private investment size but instead the elasticity of public investment 
with respect to private investment, it does not necessarily reflect the level of govern-
ment spending on the public infrastructure system. Instead, this variable reflects the 
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quality of public investment decisions relative to actual private usage and future de-
mands as determined by government physical and fiscal planning. 
 The percentage of long-term debt interest to total revenue 
This indicator reflects a government’s past investment through long-term debt finance. 
In developing countries, the main hurdle for public investment is capital market access 
(Riascos & Vegh, 2003); therefore, a larger value indicates either one of two situations: 
1) a government has a poor credit rating which result in relatively high interest rate and 
debt services, or 2) the amount of government investment is not proportionate to its 
available cash flows, which results in relatively high risks for debt defaults. Thus, a 
larger value indicates that fiscal planning and debt management are relatively ineffec-
tive and as a result the country obtains a public infrastructure that is more expensive 
than that of its peers. 
The following are the hypotheses for the effect of systematic capital investment practic-
es on public infrastructure conditions and population accessibility. 
H1: An increase in the percentage of total public investment to total public consumption 
will increase a country’s percentage of core public infrastructure in good physical con-
dition and increase a country’s population accessibility rate to the core public infrastruc-
ture. 
H2: An increase in the elasticity of public investment will increase a country’s percent-
age of core public infrastructure in good physical condition and increase a country’s 
population accessibility rate to the core public infrastructure. 
H3: An increase in the percentage of long-term debt interest to total revenue will de-
crease a country’s percentage of core public infrastructure in good physical condition 
and decrease a country’s population accessibility rate to the core public infrastructure. 
The concepts of infrastructure in good condition and population accessibility are differ-
ent. Infrastructure in good condition represents the combination of existing infrastruc-
ture stocks and the financial and technical capacity of government to maintain them. 
Population accessibility represents a combination of existing public infrastructure 
stocks, the capacity of government to provide additional investment, and an individual 
decision of the country’s citizens to use the new and existing infrastructure system. 
Thus, simply put, the infrastructure condition represents a government’s fiscal and 
planning capacity to maintain existing stocks while the accessibility represents the stock 
itself and its use. 
Given that the three indicators for public capital budgeting and management practices 
were constructed for a specific purpose in investigating the relationship between public 
investment practice and growth, we note that these indicators may not be absolutely free 
from measurement flaws. The ratio of public investment to consumption may not reflect 
the capacity of government in fiscal planning since public consumption may be reduced 
while public investment does not change. In such a case, the relatively larger ratio of 
public investment to public consumption has nothing to do with public investment and 
maintenance. Likewise, the elasticity of public to private investment is not free from 
measurement flaws. The percentage change in private investment may be relatively 
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slower in the private sectors while public investment is relatively stable, suggesting that 
public investment is highly sensitive to private investment. Given that both indicators 
are significant for infrastructure quality (see Table 2 of this study), but not significant 
for infrastructure accessibility (see Table 3 of this study), we note that such flaws may 
exist and suggest that the future studies to investigate and address such issues. 
Based on the previous finding that effective public infrastructure systems positively 
correlate with a country’s economic growth (Kumar-Jha, 2005; Calderon and Serven, 
2010a and 2010b), the second set of the study’s main hypotheses are the following. 
H4: An increase in a country’s percentage of core public infrastructure in good physical 
condition will increase national growth. 
H5: An increase in a country’s population accessibility to the core public infrastructure 
rate will increase national growth. 
Figure 1 presents the connections among the above hypotheses and conceptual frame-
work. 
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework for the Effect of Capital Budgeting Practices on 
Economic Growth 
 
Government Capital Budgeting and Management Quality 
Percent of Public Investment to Consumption, Elasticity of Public Investment, and Percent of Internal 
Debt to Total Revenue 
 
Social factors                                                                                                                        Economic factors 
Political factors                                                                                                                                        
Effective Public Infrastructure System 
Percent of Public Infrastructure in Good Physical Condition, Population Accessibility Rate 
 
                  Private Stock                                                                                                  Labor Stock 
 
Economic Performance 
Per Capita GDP 
MODEL AND DATA 
According to the median voter model, a country’s public goods and services are deter-
mined by a country’s income, tax burden, population, and citizens’ tastes and prefer-
ences (Kearns & Bartle, 2001; Sturm; 2001). Therefore, a country’s public infrastruc-
ture quality and accessibility rate is given by equation (1): 
 (1) 
where G is public goods and services, Y is median income, P is tax price, N is size of 
population, and Z is the vector of citizens’ tastes and preferences. We operationalize 
tastes and preference as a function of a country’s institutional setting, including gov-
ernment budgeting and management practices, the degree of political fragmentation, 
socioeconomic factors, and physical environments. Rewriting equation (1) with a linear 
additive demand and incorporating institutional variables in the demand function, equa-
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tions (2) and (3) stated below are used to predict the physical condition and accessibility 




 is the physical condition of the public infrastructure system measured through the 
percent of paved roads, uninterrupted electricity output distribution, and uninterrupted 
water services in country i at time t, 
 is the percent of population accessibility of the electricity, communication, water, 
and road systems publicly provided by country i at time t, 
is the per capita income of country i at time t in real dollar value, 
 is the total tax rate of country i at time t, 
 is the vector of government systematic capital investment practices for country i at 
time t, including: 
 : the percentage of public investment to consumption, 
 : the elasticity of public investment, 
 : the percentage of long-term debt interest to total revenue, 
 is the vector of political fragmentation in country i at time t, including: 
  the effective numbers of ministers in parliament, 
 : the number of political parties in parliament, and 
is the vector of social factors in country i at time t, including: 
 : the ratio of the urban population to the total population, 
: total population, 
: the ratio of population aged 65 and over to total population, and 
: the ratio of budget deficits to total revenue, and 
is the vector of economic factors in country i at time t, including: 
: per capita foreign aid, and  
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 per capita foreign direct investment (FDI). 
The next equation is to establish a testing model for the path from public infrastructure 
quality and accessibility to a country’s output. According to Cobb-Douglas’s production 
function (Mankiw, Romer, & Weil, 1992), national economic output is a function of 
technological level, labor, and physical capital stocks. Thus, the testing model for this 
path is defined as follows:  
 (4) 
where; 
  is per capita Gross Domestic Product in real dollar value of country i at time t, 
is laborer in country i at time t, 
is the private investment as a share of GDP in country i and time t, 
 is the physical condition of the public infrastructure system measured through the 
percentage of paved roadways in a country, the percentage of a country with uninter-
rupted electricity output distribution, and the percentage of a country with uninterrupted 
water services in country i at time t, 
 is the percent of population accessibility of the electricity, communication, water, 
and road systems publicly provided by country i at time t 
In order to test hypotheses 1 through 5, the path analysis method was used. 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the study data. The data were derived from 
25 developing countries3 as classified by The World Bank during the period from 1990 
to 2000, resulting in 275 observations (25 countries*11 years = 275). All fiscal variables 
are in constant dollars (base year 2000) and were gathered from the Government Fi-
nance Statistics CD-ROM, published by the International Monetary Fund (2006). Social 
and economic data were obtained from World Development Indicators complied by The 
World Bank (2006). Political variables were calculated from the Database of Political 
Institutions (DPI) from The World Bank (2006). The data for percentage of private in-
vestment to GDP were derived from the paper “Trends in Private Investment Develop-
ing Countries” by Everhart and Sumlinski (2000). The data are available from 1970 to 
2000. Given that the data is standardized by GDP (and multiplied by 100), the dollar 
value was not converted in to constant value. The values of this variable are shown in 
Appendix III. 
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Table1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Variable Name Mean Std. Devia-
tion 
Minimum Maximum 
Q Per Capita Gross Domestic 
Product (Real Dollar Value) $2,454 $1,736 $312 $8,213 
L Labor (Million)  25.00 69.60 0.46 389.00 
K Percent of Private Stock to GDP  14.049 5.657 0.346 34.413 
Y Per Capita Income (Real Dollar 
Value) $2,213 $1,534 $227 $8,142 
P Tax Rate  17.1% 15.7% 3.9% 105.9% 
M1 Percent of Public Investment to 
Consumption  12.8% 12.5% -8.6% 61.8% 
M2 Elasticity of Public Investment 
(unit free) 0.975 1.309 -10.673 12.104 
M3 Percent of Long-term Debt 
Interest to Total Revenue  17.2% 13.3% 0.0% 92.7% 
KGQ Percent of Public Infrastructure 
System in Good Physical Con-
dition  
64.20% 15.50% 40.90% 98% 
KGA Percent of Population Accessi-
bility to Public Infrastructure 
System  
18.9% 6.7% 0.5% 29.8% 
D1 Effective Numbers of Ministers 
in Parliament  3.172 1.835 1.000 11.467 
D2 Effective Numbers of Political 
Parties in Parliament  0.593 0.211 0.000 0.921 
S1 Ratio of Urban Population to 
Total Population  55.70% 18.70% 13% 91.70% 
S2 Total Population  64,730,288 178,666,691 1,057,000 999,016,000 
S3 Ratio of Population Aged 65 
and Over to Total Population  14.05% 5.70% 0.34% 34.40% 
S4 Ratio of Budget Deficits to 
Total Revenue  25.3% 89.5% 0.0% 640.0% 
E1 Per Capita Foreign Aid  16.77 34.08 0.00 372.64 
E2 Per Capita Foreign Direct In-
vestment  51.05 77.38 3.78 663.94 
Total Observations = 275 
Since there is no public data availability for key variables including public infrastructure 
quality and accessibility at the time this paper was in progress, the data for these varia-
bles were constructed by the authors through World Development Indicators 
(http://data.worldbank.org/products/data-books/WDI-2006) complied by The World 
Bank (2011). As discussed in the Conceptual Framework section of this paper, an effec-
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tive public infrastructure system is defined as “the physical conditions of a country’s 
core public infrastructure, including road, electricity, and water systems as well as citi-
zen accessibility to the main public infrastructure systems.” The concept of a country’s 
effective public infrastructure thus can be operationalized by two indicators: 1) the av-
erage percentage of a country’s paved roads to total roads, uninterrupted electricity, and 
water distribution output; and 2) the average percentage of people with accessibility to 
the country’s roads, electricity, water, and communication facilities. Table 2 below pre-
sents the World Development Indicators comprised for quality and quantity indexes. 
Table 2: The indicators for quality and accessibility indexes 
QUALITY ACCESSIBILITY 
1. Roads, paved (% of total roads) 1. Improved Water Source, Rural (Percent of Rural 
Population With Access)  
2. Road Sector Energy Consumption (% of total 
energy consumption) 
2. Improved Water Source, Urban (Percent of Ur-
ban Population With Access) 
3. Percent of Domestic Annual Freshwater With-
drawal to a country’s total withdrawal  
3. Telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people) 
4. Electric power transmission and distribution 
losses (% of output) which is (100percent interrup-
ted data) = percent of uninterrupted power.  
4. Road per 1000 
 5. Electricity Production per 1000 
 6.Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 
1,000 people) 
For the quality index, we simply added up the percentages of all four subscales (the left 
column of Table 2) and divided the sum value by four and then multiplied the ratio with 
100, yielding the average percentage of core infrastructure in good quality. For accessi-
bility index, as shown in Table 2, scale numbers 3 through 6 are in per thousand; thus, 
we converted these scales by dividing each of these per thousand values by 1,000 and 
then multiplying such ratios by 100 to obtain percentage value. Finally we simply added 
up the values from the six scales, and then divided the summed values by 6 and multi-
plied the ratio with 100, yielding the average percentage of a country’s core infrastruc-
ture accessibility. As shown in Table 1: the mean for quality of core public infrastruc-
ture is 64.2% while the mean for accessibility is 18.9%. See Appendixes I and II for the 
quality and accessibility data, respectively. 
The strengths of these indexes are as follows. First, the indexes embrace important in-
frastructure sectors for development including electricity, transportation, water and 
communication. Second, the indexes are easily interpreted given that they are simply the 
average values of the selected World Development Indicators. Third, the indexes are 
time-variant data which is suitable in understanding annual impact of government prac-
tices on core infrastructure output and outcome through panel data analysis method with 
fixed effect estimator. 
The weaknesses of such indexes include 1) given that there is no weighting system in 
constructing these index, it may be difficult in terms of pinpointing which sector is more 
important in applying the empirical results to practices and 2) the indexes may not pure-
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ly represent a country’s government investment outputs given that some of the infra-
structure quality and accessibility scales may include infrastructure outputs provided by 
private sectors and foreign donors. If the latter is true, the indexes thus partially reflect 
government management capacity rather than completely reflecting government man-
agement capacity. 
RESULTS 
We used the path analysis method to analyze the entire process of capital investment 
practices and growth presented in Figure 1 with two steps. 
1. Understanding the causal relationship between public capital management 
practices and public infrastructure quality and accessibility rates. 
2. Understanding the causal relationship between public infrastructure quality 
and accessibility rates and a country’s growth. 
The path analysis method is one among several causal modeling techniques available 
used in examining whether a pattern of inter-correlations among variables fit the re-
searchers’ underlying theory of which variables causing other variables (Mertler & 
Vannatta, 2005, p.199). The analytical approach for the path analysis is similar to those 
of standard Two-stage Least Square (2SLS) method in that both approaches estimate the 
causal relationship of the variables of interest in the first stage. We estimated another 
causal relationship of the variables in the second stage using the predicted values of the 
variables obtained from the first stage as the model’s independent variables. 
The path analysis and 2SLS are different in three points. First, unlike the 2SLS equa-
tions, for the path analysis, the estimating equations in stage one (i.e., equations 2 and 3 
of this paper) and stage two (i.e., equation 4 of this paper) are not necessarily the same 
in the sense that all auxiliary variables (i.e., control variables) must be presented in both 
equations. Path analysis begins with the researchers developing structural diagrams with 
arrows connecting variables and depicting casual flow for a direction of cause-and-
effect (Mertler & Vannatta, 2008, p.199). The structural diagram is influenced by sever-
al sources on information including literature research, formal and informal theories, 
personal observations and experiences with the phenomenon of interest, expert opin-
ions, and last but not least, common sense and logic (Mertler & Vannatta, 2008, p.200). 
The specification of the equations (i.e., equations 2 and 3 for the first stage and equation 
4 for the second stage) is the researchers’ formal declaration of the literature and theo-
ries drawn from several sources regarding the logical causal linkage among the model’s 
variables. 
Second, because of the approaches described in the first point above, 2SLS and path 
analysis are also different in that while the former methodology reveals only the direct 
effect of capital management practices on growth, path analysis reveals both direct and 
indirect effects of capital management practices on growth. Table 5 of this paper pre-
sents the empirical results for the indirect effects of capital management practices on 
growth as mediated by a country’s core infrastructure quality and accessibility.4 Based 
on our theoretical model shown in Figure 1, we meant to estimate the indirect effect of 
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capital management practice on growth, rather than the direct effect of capital manage-
ment on growth. 
Third, while the standard 2SLS uses Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method in estimating 
coefficients, path analysis is relatively more flexible in allowing unobserved heteroge-
neity panel data analysis depending on data types. Given that we have panel data, we 
employ models that capture unobserved heterogeneity, rather than OLS to find the rela-
tionship slopes. 
Autocorrelation is another inherent problem for panel data. Autocorrelation occurs 
when the data in the current year explains the data in the following years in the same 
country, and such correlation is persistent for long periods (Kennedy, 2008). In order to 
purge such autocorrelation, researchers have two choices. 
1. Taking simple first differences in which the previous year data is subtracted from 
the current year data. 
2. Directly transforming the data (see endnote 5). 
We first attempted the simple differencing method, but found that autocorrelation was 
not completely removed. We then directly transformed the data by multiplying the 
lagged value of the data by the first-order autocorrelation coefficient and then subtract-
ing that value from the current value of the data. This transformation method is de-
scribed in footnote 5 of this paper. Thus, the dependent variable, growth, of stage two in 
path analysis is the first difference of the current year per capita GDP and its own 
lagged, being weighted by its own autocorrelation coefficient (see Wooldridge 2008, 
p.426 and endnote 5). 
We also conducted a Hausman test to determine whether fixed or random effect estima-
tors are appropriate for our panel data. The results indicates that at the .01 significance 
level the fixed effect estimator is more appropriate than random effect given that the 
countries’ dummy variables are highly associated with the model’s independent varia-
bles and error terms. We thus used fixed effects estimators for our panel data throughout 
the two steps of our path analysis. The empirical results shown in Tables 3,4, and 5 are 
the within effects of capital management practices on growth. 
In order to test our hypotheses, the first step was to estimate the effects of systematic 
capital investment practices on the quality of the public infrastructure system using 
equation (2), controlling for political, social, and economic factors. Table 3 presents the 
results from this step. Regression diagnostics further indicated that the error terms were 
constant within each country, but correlated across countries. Thus, panel-corrected 
standard errors were computed according to the method of Beck & Katz (1995). 
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Table 3: Empirical Results for the Effects of Government Institutions on Public  
Infrastructure 














Dependent Variable: Percent of Public Infrastructure System in Good Physical Condition (KGQ) 
Basic Variable 
    Per Capita Income (Y) .007*** 0.002 2.85 0.004 
Tax Rate (P) -.371 .342 -1.08 0.279 
 
Government Capital Management Practices 
    Ratio of Public Investment to Consumption (M1) 3.159*** 1.048 3.02 0.003 
Elasticity of Public Investment (M2) 2.317*** 0.791 2.93 0.003 
Ratio of Long-term Debt Interest to Total Revenue (M3) -3.455 11.780 -0.29 0.769 
 
Political Institution 
    Effective Numbers of Ministers in Parliament (D1) 0.233 0.732 0.32 0.750 
Effective Numbers of Political Parties in Parliament 
(D2) -1.344** .683 -1.97 0.049 
 
Socio-Economic Institution 
    Ratio of Urban Population to Total Population (S1) 0.354 0.223 1.59 0.112 
Total Population (S2) 2.458 1.597 1.54 0.124 
Ratio of Population Aged 65 and Over to Total Popula-
tion (S3) -0.740 0.284 -2.60 0.009 
Ratio of Budget Deficits to Total Revenue (S4) 1.292 3.085 0.42 0.675 
 
External Institutions 
    Per Capita Foreign Aid (E1) -24.735 34.505 -0.72 0.473 
Per Capita Foreign Direct Investment (E2) 1.054 0.585 1.80 0.072 
Constant 1.094 0.894 1.22 0.221 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.1595       
Wald chi2  43.160 
   Prob > chi2       0.002 
   Number of Observation  275    
Note: ** indicates statistical significance at the 05 level. *** indicates statistical significance at the .01 
level. Country-fixed effects and time-fixed effects were removed by entity and time demeaning prior to 
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regression estimation. Autocorrelation correction was conducted through the method of Prais-Winsten 
(see footnote). Panel-corrected standard errors were computed according to Beck & Katz (1995). 
The results in Table 3 suggest that overall the model explains a significant part of the 
variation in the physical condition of a country’s core public infrastructure. The adjust-
ed R-squared indicates that 16% of the variation in the physical condition of public in-
frastructure was explained by the model independent variables. As shown in the table, 
systematic investment practices measured through two variables, the ratio of public in-
vestment to public consumption (M1) and the elasticity of public investment (M2), were 
strongly significant for the quality of a country’s public infrastructure system. A per-
centage increase in public investment to consumption results in a 3.2 percent increase in 
the better physical condition of public infrastructure. A one-unit increase in the degree 
of government responsiveness to private investment results in a 2.3 percent increase in 
the physical condition of public infrastructure throughout a country, everything else 
equal. These results suggest that a country’s government institutional practice in con-
ducting fiscal and physical planning that is responsive to private demands enhances the 
quality of the public infrastructure system. 
For the other control variables, the results in Table 3 suggest that the number of political 
parties in parliament significantly affects the country’s public infrastructure quality. A 
one-party increase in the parliament reduces the quality of public infrastructure by about 
1.3 percent. The control variable results were generally in the direction and magnitude 
expected. Of note, a dollar increase in per capita income results in a 0.7 percent increase 
in the core public infrastructure being in good physical condition. The predicted value 
of the physical condition of public infrastructure was saved for estimation of the eco-
nomic growth model. 
The next task was to estimate the effects of government management, and political, so-
cial, and economic factors, on the accessibility of public infrastructure systems using 
equation (3). Table 4 presents the results. The statistical procedures were the same as 
those in the first step, except that an autocorrelation correction procedure was not con-
ducted since the initial regression results indicated that there was no serial correction for 
the infrastructure accessibility data. 
Table 4: Empirical Results for the Effects of Government Institutions on Public    
Infrastructure 















Dependent Variable: Percent of Population Accessibility to Public Infrastructure System (KGA) 
Basic Variable 
    Per Capita Income (Y) .015** 0.006 2.38 0.018 
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Tax Rate (P) .317 .889 0.36 0.721 
 
Government Capital Management Practices 
    Percent of Public Investment to Consumption (M1) -42.722 27.699 -1.54 0.123 
Elasticity of Public Investment (M2) 0.612 1.525 0.40 0.688 
Percent of Long-term Debt Interest to Total Revenue 
(M3) -.929** .393 -2.36 0.018 
 
Political Institution 
    Effective Numbers of Ministers in Parliament (D1) -0.574 1.321 -0.43 0.664 
Effective Numbers of Political Parties in Parliament 
(D2) 6.081 11.274 0.54 0.590 
 
Socio-Economic Institution 
    Ratio of Urban Population to Total Population (S1) -0.543 0.392 -1.38 0.166 
Total Population (S2) 0.501 0.574 0.87 0.383 
Ratio of Population Aged 65 and Over to Total Popula-
tion (S3) 5.150 4.041 1.27 0.202 
Ratio of Budget Deficits to Total Revenue (S4) -1.244 9.536 -0.13 0.896 
 
External Institutions 
    Per Capita Foreign Aid (E1) 11.290 33.802 0.33 0.738 
Per Capita Foreign Direct Investment (E2) -1.472** 0.741 -1.99 0.047 
Intercept -1.968 1.598 -1.23 0.218 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.1312 
   Wald chi2  109.380 
   Prob > chi2       0.000 
   Number of Observation  275    
Note: ** indicates statistical significance at the 05 level. *** indicates statistical significance at the .01 
level. Country-fixed effects and time-fixed effects were removed by entity and time demeaning prior to 
regression estimation. Panel-corrected standard errors were computed according to Beck & Katz (1995). 
For two control variables, a dollar increase in per capita income resulted in an estimated 
1.5 percent increase in the accessibility rate. Per capita foreign direct investment signifi-
cantly and negatively affected population accessibility to core public infrastructure. This 
may be due to the “focusing” effect of foreign direct investment (FDI), where capital 
investment in low income countries is targeted to areas with large inflows of FDI and 
therefore it competes with local residents in other areas for limited public infrastructure. 
The predicted value of the population accessibility rate for core public infrastructure 
was also saved for the next step of the method in estimating the effect of this variable on 
growth. 
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The final step was to enter the predicted values for infrastructure physical condition and 
accessibility, along with other institutional variables, into a regression predicting eco-
nomic growth. According to equation (4), the dependent variable, national productivity, 
was measured through Real Per Capita Gross Domestic Product. The control variables 
included per capita private capital stocks and labor supply, two variables which usually 
are employed in empirical economic growth models. All statistical procedures were 
used as in the previous steps. 
Table 5: Empirical Results for Indirect Effect of Systematic Capital Investment Prac-
tices on Productivity Growth Mediated Through Public Infrastructure Condition and 
Accessibility Rates (Equation 4) 












Dependent Variable: Changed in Per Capita Gross Domestic Product 
(Real Dollar Value) 
   Number of Laborers (Million) (L) -11.872*** 2.620 -4.53 0.000 
Percent of Private Investment to GDP (K) 13.915*** 2.950 4.72 0.000 
Predicted Percent of Public Infrastructure System in 
Good Physical Condition ( ) 4.693*** 0.874 5.37 0.000 
Predicted Percent of Population Accessibility to Public 
Infrastructure System ( ) 11.027*** 1.731 6.37 0.000 
Per Capita Income (Y) 0.360*** 0.017 20.96 0.000 
Tax Rate (P) .812*** .305 2.66 0.008 
Effective Numbers of Ministers in Parliament (D1) 8.787 7.296 1.2 0.203 
Effective Numbers of Political Parties in Parliament (D2) -8.781 6..245 -1.39 0.166 
Ratio of Urban Population to Total Population (S1) 5.390*** 2.063 2.61 0.01 
Total Population (S2) -19.132 11.834 -1.62 0.107 
Ratio of Population Aged 65 and Over to Total Popula-
tion (S3) -17.706 32.062 -0.55 0.581 
Ratio of Budget Deficits to Total Revenue (S4) 0 0 1.25 0.214 
Per Capita Foreign Aid (E1) 40.241** 19.168 2.1 0.037 
Per Capita Foreign Direct Investment (E2) 30.119 31.163 0.97 0.335 
Constant 0.095 7.086 0.01 0.989 
Adjusted R-Square  0.742       
Wald chi2  649.9 
   Prob > chi2 0.000 
   Number of Observation  275    
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Note: ** indicates statistical significance at the 05 level. *** indicates statistical significance at the .01 level. Coun-
try-fixed effects and time-fixed effects were removed by entity and time demeaning prior to regression estimation. 
Autocorrelation correction was conducted through the method of Prais-Winsten (see footnote). Panel-corrected 
standard errors were computed according to Beck & Katz (1995). 
Table 5 presents the results estimated by equation (4). The predicted public capital con-
dition ( )) and accessibility ( ) were strongly significant with the expected directions: 
increases in the physical condition and accessibility rate of a country’s core public in-
frastructure system enhance growth. These results suggest that the model stated in equa-
tions 2 and 3 are completed in terms of containing important explanatory variables. The 
main findings were that the ratio of public investment to consumption (M1), elasticity 
of public to private investment (M2), and ratio of past investment to total revenue (M3) 
indirectly enhanced national growth through better the physical condition and accessi-
bility rates of the public infrastructure system. 
One curious result for the control variables is noted. In our model, changes in labor sup-
ply were estimated to have a negative effect on productivity. In most developed country 
studies, the sign of the labor supply coefficient is positive. However, in low income 
countries, it is quite possible that labor and capital are strong substitutes. Countries that 
rely heavily on labor-intensive industries may not have large investment in capital. In-
creases in labor supplies would therefore represent competition for resources, not in-
creased resource bases. Using the same model as those models estimated in Table 5 and 
directly incorporating the three capital management variables (M1, M2, and M3), the 
results indicated that all else equal, these management variables have no direct effect on 
growth. 
Implications 
Based on the descriptive statistics shown in Table 1, sample mean countries annually 
invest in their core public infrastructure at about 13% of the total current operation 
budget and have long-term debt interest payment at about 17% of the total revenue. The 
sample mean countries tended not to be highly responsive to private investment demand 
given that the elasticity of their public to private investment was less than 1.0 (mean 
elasticity was 0.97). Using these sample mean data and the indirect effects on systemat-
ic management practice reported in Tables 3, 4, and 5, the calculated indirect effects of 
systematic capital investment practices on growth for the study samples are as follows. 
First, if the sample mean countries increased their investment as a percent of consump-
tion from 13% to 14%, their per capita GDP would increase by about $15 per person 
((4.693/100) * (3.159*100) = $14.8) through better public infrastructure conditions. 
Second, if these countries reduced their debt cost to total revenue from 17% to 16%, 
they would see an increase in per capita GDP at about $11 per person ((11.027/100) * 
(.929*100) = $10.9) through a better rate of population accessibility to the public infra-
structure system. Finally, if these countries were more responsive to private investment 
demand by 1 more unit point, they would see a per capita GDP increase at about $10 
per person ((4.693/100) * (2.317*100) = $10.2) through better public infrastructure 
conditions. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This paper investigates the path effects of government capital management on national 
growth. The determinants of economic growth have been a relatively unexplored area in 
the literature. The paper looks solely at developing countries, a set of countries that the 
literature has thus far ignored. This focus, however, presents some problems, mainly 
with obtaining consistent data over a sufficient time frame for analysis. The results from 
the path analysis indicate that government management and political institutions indi-
rectly affected national productivity through the physical condition and accessibility of 
core public infrastructure in the 25 developing countries. This is in accordance with 
previous research on developing countries, which concluded that good governance 
makes public spending more effective in terms of accomplishing targeted outcomes 
(Rajkumar & Swaroop, 2008). The results in this study specifically suggest that if a 
government adopts systematic capital investment practices, its per capita GDP will in-
crease for about $10-$15 in the real dollar value through the country’s better public in-
frastructure service system. This dollar value increase may not make a country move 
from low income group to middle income group over a year, but the annual increase can 
help alleviate poverty level along with other development practices. 
There are some limitations which must be discussed with respect to the results. First the 
variables representing public infrastructure condition and access were only constructed 
variables. There is likely to be some errors in the measurement of the constructs of con-
dition and access. Future studies should attempt to model these constructs more fully. 
Second, the panel data were relatively short, including only 10 years. Though the econ-
ometrics was defensible for short panels, the use of data spanning longer time periods 
should be undertaken to generate results with which to compare the results in this study. 
Finally, in using only developing countries, we chose not include industrialized coun-
tries and thus the results are generalizable only to developing countries. There may be 
different sets of dynamics occurring in developed countries. Other recent work has tak-
en up this examination in the United States (Srithongrung, 2008), but an extension to 
other developed countries would be better for the development of the literature. Within 
the bounds of these limitations, however, the paper contributes to the empirical litera-
ture around the determinants of economic growth and the role that government man-
agement plays in public infrastructure systems and national productivity. 
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NOTES 
 
1 According to Dabla-Norris et al (2011), the sources include World Bank Public In-
vestment Management (PIM) case studies, the Budget Institutions database, World 
Bank Public Expenditure Reviews (PERs), World Bank Country Procurement Asses-
sment Reviews, and World Bank Country Financial Accountability Assessments and 
each specific country website. 
2 International Budgeting Practices and Procedures Databases (2011) provide survey 
data across 97 countries regarding their operational and capital budgeting practices in 
years 2003, 2005, and 2007. However, the questionnaire items for capital budgeting 
practices are not available in 2003 edition and are not consistent for 2005 and 2007 
editions. Due to this problem, we did not adopt capital budgeting practices data from 
this organization because the data are sporadic and may not be conceptually valid. 
See the survey questionnaires at http://www.oecd.org/document/61/ 
0,3746,en_2649_34119_2494461_1_1_1_1,00.html 
3 The 25 countries in our sample included Argentina, Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
the Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, I.R. of Iran, Mauri-
tius, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, 
Romania, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
4 Path analysis allow us to also estimate the direct effect of capital management prac-
tice on growth, but conceptually, we focus on indirect path rather than direct path of 
government practices given that economic growth can be resulted from other factors 
outside government performances. We believe the direct effect of government capital 
management practices is relatively weak and thus it may not be very much useful in 
understanding the direct effect of government programs on growth. 
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Argentina 55.1 54.8 54.1 54.2 55.2 55.7 55.8 56.6 57.2 57.3 56.7 
Bulgaria 90.5 89.0 89.0 89.5 89.6 89.3 89.3 88.9 89.3 90.5 91.0 
Colombia 45.3 45.5 46.3 45.2 44.9 43.6 45.0 44.8 45.6 45.3 44.6 
Costa Rica 53.5 54.1 54.1 54.3 54.2 54.6 54.5 54.8 56.6 57.2 57.6 
Dominican 
Republic 60.1 60.2 59.4 59.8 60.2 60.5 63.1 66.5 75.7 61.0 60.4 
Egypt 81.0 80.9 81.2 80.6 82.3 83.4 81.3 84.3 84.0 83.7 82.6 
El Salva-
dor 49.1 50.2 49.9 51.8 52.1 53.6 53.2 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 
Guatema-
la 55.4 56.1 56.8 56.9 57.2 55.9 54.9 54.0 55.2 59.6 56.6 
India 61.3 63.9 66.6 68.0 68.4 68.2 67.0 67.8 67.3 65.6 65.2 
Iran, I.R. 
of 52.1 54.7 56.3 60.7 66.4 67.8 69.9 71.3 70.8 72.6 73.1 
Mauritius 96.5 96.5 96.5 96.5 96.5 96.5 97.5 97.5 98.0 98.0 98.5 
Mexico 61.4 61.9 61.2 61.2 58.6 58.5 58.6 57.8 59.9 59.2 58.4 
Nicaragua 46.5 44.4 44.3 43.8 41.9 41.2 41.0 41.5 40.9 41.9 40.6 
Pakistan 66.6 66.6 65.4 65.6 65.6 61.1 60.3 59.7 61.3 64.2 65.9 




51.6 51.6 51.6 51.6 51.6 51.7 51.8 51.8 51.8 51.8 51.8 
Paraguay 54.1 54.3 54.3 53.7 53.9 53.9 54.7 56.4 58.1 74.0 75.7 
Peru 48.1 49.5 46.4 46.1 45.2 46.4 47.5 47.9 50.0 50.5 50.9 
Romania 70.1 70.3 70.4 70.4 70.9 69.8 70.3 70.6 70.5 70.2 68.4 
South 
Africa 61.9 62.6 63.2 64.9 65.8 67.7 56.0 55.9 55.7 55.9 56.0 
Thailand 72.4 88.8 89.7 92.3 92.5 94.6 94.4 94.4 94.4 94.6 95.3 
Tunisia 82.9 82.6 82.3 82.8 83.6 84.5 84.4 84.3 76.6 76.7 78.9 
Turkey 51.4 52.3 52.7 52.9 53.0 53.5 54.1 53.5 54.6 57.7 58.1 
Uruguay 80.0 80.8 82.2 84.5 85.1 84.2 85.1 85.6 87.4 85.6 84.7 
Venezuela, 
Rep. Bol. 58.8 58.6 59.5 59.8 57.9 57.3 57.3 56.3 55.8 55.1 55.2 
 
Arwiphawee Srithongrung and Kenneth A. Kriz 
 
 International Public Management Review  Vol. 13, Iss. 2, 2012 
 www.ipmr.net  47 IPMR
APENDIX II: Public Infrastructure Accessibility Data 
Accessibility 
Rate 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Argentina 8.7 9.0 9.7 10.7 12.0 13.3 14.3 15.9 17.2 18.8 19.1 
Bulgaria 24.7 24.2 24.2 25.3 26.0 27.5 28.4 29.3 29.8 31.2 32.6 
Colombia 6.1 6.4 6.3 6.9 7.5 8.1 9.2 10.5 11.8 12.0 12.7 
Costa Rica 7.7 8.2 8.6 9.2 10.2 10.8 11.3 13.9 14.5 15.6 17.4 
Dominican 
Republic 3.8 4.3 5.2 5.4 5.7 5.8 6.4 6.8 7.9 8.8 9.1 
Egypt 3.4 3.6 3.7 3.9 4.1 4.4 4.7 5.1 5.6 6.3 6.5 
El Salvador 2.4 2.4 2.7 2.9 3.6 4.1 4.4 4.8 5.4 7.7 8.2 
Guatemala 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.4 2.7 3.2 3.8 4.8 5.2 
India 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.1 
Iran, I.R. of 4.8 5.2 5.8 6.6 7.3 8.0 8.6 9.5 10.4 11.3 11.7 
Mauritius 2.7 3.1 3.8 5.0 6.0 6.9 8.6 10.7 11.9 13.2 15.7 
Mexico 7.0 7.4 7.8 8.4 9.1 9.3 9.5 10.1 10.9 12.7 13.1 
Nicaragua 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.8 3.0 3.4 
Pakistan 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 
Panama 7.3 7.6 7.8 8.3 8.8 9.1 9.6 10.5 11.9 14.1 15.4 
Papua New 
Guinea 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9 
Paraguay 17.6 18.4 16.8 18.9 21.1 23.8 24.7 25.3 26.2 29.0 29.6 
Peru 3.0 2.9 2.9 3.2 3.5 4.2 5.0 5.7 5.8 6.2 6.5 
Romania 12.2 11.6 11.8 12.0 12.4 13.3 14.0 14.3 14.9 15.7 17.5 
South Africa 16.6 16.4 16.4 16.5 16.8 17.6 18.5 19.5 20.1 21.1 22.3 
Thailand 3.3 3.7 4.3 4.9 5.8 7.0 8.0 8.9 8.8 9.0 9.7 
Tunisia 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.4 4.8 5.1 5.5 5.9 6.6 7.3 8.1 
Turkey 8.8 9.9 11.1 12.5 13.5 14.5 15.6 17.1 18.8 21.2 24.4 
Uruguay 12.8 12.9 15.0 14.8 15.2 14.9 16.1 17.9 21.0 21.4 21.7 
Venezuela, 
Rep. Bol. 11.4 11.9 12.8 13.5 14.1 14.5 15.1 15.9 16.4 17.8 17.9 




1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Argentina 9.4 12.7 14.9 18.1 19.1 15.8 16.1 17.3 17.9 16.1 17.1 
Bulgaria 0.8 0.5 0.3 2.9 5.4 6.8 5.3 5.5 7 8 5.9 
Columbia 10.2 8.4 8.3 10.8 16.7 14.5 13 11 9.9 5.5 11.3 
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Costa Rica 17.7 15.5 16.6 18.3 14.6 13.8 12.2 14.0 18.2 19.1 15.7 
Dominican 
Republic 18.2 15.3 15.4 16.4 12.6 11 10.2 12.7 16.6 18.9 14.0 
Egypt 16.7 13.1 10.5 9.2 10.5 10.7 10.5 12.1 12.3 13 11.7 
El Salvador 11.2 12.3 13.2 13.7 14.7 15 12.1 12.7 13.2 13 13.1 
Guatemala 10.4 9.8 13.2 13.4 11.7 12 10.8 12.1 13.7 14.8 12.5 
India 13.9 12.9 14.2 13.4 13.2 16.7 15.9 15.4 15 14.9 15.2 
Iran 8.5 13.6 13.4 11.4 12.8 12.6 14.2 14.2 13.4 13 13.5 
Mauritius 19.2 20.4 18.3 20.6 21.7 16.3 16.7 20.8 18.3 21.8 18.8 
Mexico 13.6 14.6 15.8 14.8 14.3 12.4 14.9 16.4 18.3 18.9 16.4 
Nicaragua 11.2 10.7 9.7 8.9 9.6 10.6 11.6 18.2 19.8 22 16.1 
Pakistani 8.9 8.9 9.8 10 9.6 8.7 9.1 10.3 9.5 8.3 9.6 
Panama 7.4 12 15.1 19.2 20.8 21.8 21.2 22.3 23.2 26.3 21.8 
Papua New 
Guinea 20.0 23.3 18.6 12.5 11.6 15.7 24.2 21.6 23.3  
21.3 
Paraguay 19.2 20.4 18.2 18.8 19 17.7 18.2 15.2 14.4 14.2 16.0 
Peru 12.9 13.1 12.4 13.7 16.4 19.5 18.3 19.6 19.4 16.8 18.7 
Romania  
 
1.4 2.3 3.7 5.9 7.1 7.6 6.2 6.6 6.9 6.3 
South Africa 12.9 11 10.4 10.3 11 11.6 11.7 11.8 11.1 10.3 11.4 
Thailand 34.2 34.4 31.1 31.6 31.2 32 30.8 22.2 19.4 19.4 24.4 
Tunisia 19.7 19.9 20.3 12.8 13.3 11.9 11.9 12.7 13.2 13.1 13.1 
Turkey 15.8 16.1 15.6 18.3 19.4 20 20.2 20.6 18.8 16.1 19.4 
Uruguay 8.3 9.3 9.9 10.3 10.1 9.9 10.5 10.6 10.9 10.6 10.5 
Venezuela 4.9 7.6 8.9 9 8.2 7.1 7 9.4 10.7 8.8 9.2 
Source: Everhart, S. E. & Sumlinski, M.A. (2001). Trends in Private Investment in Developing Countries, 
Statistics for 1970-2000. International Finance Corporation 
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From the Editor 
All papers submitted to IPMR are subject to two double blind peer reviews, including 
suggestions for improvements. As an example of how the process works, the paper: 
“From Public Infrastructure to National Economic Growth: Do Strategic Investment 
Practices Matter” was reviewed by two researchers with considerable experience in the 
area. The first reviewer found that the paper was well organized, well written, well re-
searched, well and appropriately cited, and methodologically sound. The reviewer found 
that the conclusions followed clearly from both the stated objective of the paper up front 
and from the analysis. 
The second reviewer had quite a different view, suggesting areas of improvement in-
cluding the inclusion of key citations in the literature review, clarification on concepts 
relate to infrastructure stock versus infrastructure use, and explanations of the data used 
in the analysis. 
The second reviewer found that the focus on infrastructure and growth did not appear to 
add anything new to the rather large literature already established on the subject. A 
more fruitful approach would be to focus only on the impact of government investment 
practices on infrastructure quality. Yet, the author cannot pursue this in a credible fash-
ion if he/she wishes to retain flawed independent variables. For example, the hypothesis 
that the ratio of public investment to public consumption will be positively correlated 
with the percent of infrastructure in good shape is undermined by the possibility that the 
share could increase because public consumption is reduced with no potential impact at 
all on infrastructure maintenance or investment. Alternatively, some shock could cause 
both investment and consumption to shift by the same percent so that the ratio is un-
changed – and yet the real financing flowing to infrastructure maintenance or invest-
ment will have changed and should affect outcomes. In another example, the hypothesis 
that the elasticity of public investment to private investment is positively correlated with 
the percent of infrastructure in good shape is also subject to attack. It might be the case 
that private investment falls in response to some shock (weakened business outlook) 
which would make the ratio higher and yet leave real public financing for infrastructure 
maintenance or investment unaffected. 
The dependent variables look worrisome as well. The author's explanation of how these 
data were generated left the reviewer in doubt. The index of infrastructure quality in-
cludes "road sector energy consumption" which is more a function of vehicle efficiency 
and density than road quality. The index also includes electrical transmission line losses 
which is a good idea except that the author claims that this sub-component is added into 
the index, as if losses are a good thing. Another part of the index refers to the domestic 
share of total freshwater withdrawals. It doesn't make sense to include this in an index 
of infrastructure quality: this is a measure of a country's pressure on its water resources 
and therefore on the sustainability of its water use. Water losses per km of pipe might be 
a better measure. Another dependent variable, the index of accessibility, incorrectly 
includes energy production when access is more a function of distribution. It also in-
cludes redundant information with one sub-indicator focused on telephone mainlines 
and another focused on mainlines plus mobile subscriptions. Bottom line: rather than 
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inventing new indices, why not make use of the data already available from Serven and 
Calderon (2010) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5317 for infrastructure 
quality ... a paper which the author now cites in other parts of the manuscript? 
Finally, the author's explanation of how path analysis is or is not the same as 2SLS re-
gression, and why it is better, was not at all clear and was generally unconvincing. 
Send us your views on this or other papers in this issue. You can do this: 
--on the IPMN list serve http://ipmn.net 
--on facebook https://www.facebook.com/groups/216998220071/ 
--or email directly to the Editor cwescott@post.harvard.edu 
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